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Abstract
Software integrity measurement and attestation
(M&A) are critical technologies for evaluating the
trustworthiness of software platforms. To best sup-
port these technologies, next generation systems must
provide a centralized service for securely selecting,
collecting, and evaluating integrity measurements.
Centralization of M&A avoids duplication, minimizes
security risks to the system, and ensures correct ad-
ministration of integrity policies and systems. This
paper details the desirable features and properties
of such a system, and introduces Maat, a prototype
implementation of an M&A service that meets these
properties. Maat is a platform service that provides
a centralized policy-driven framework for determin-
ing which measurement tools and protocols to use to
meet the needs of a given integrity evaluation. Maat
simplifies the task of integrating integrity measure-
ments into a range of larger trust decisions such as
authentication, network access control, or delegated
computations.
1 Introduction
System integrity is an increasingly important and
often overlooked input to security decisions. Integrity
measurements (or evidence) can be collected to verify
that (1) the correct software or hardware platform is
being used and (2) the system is in a valid state. The
increasing use of a diverse set of integrity information
to inform security decisions motivates the development
of a centralized, comprehensive, and flexible system-
level service for selecting and producing these types
of measurements. The primary contributions of this
paper are (1) a design for an integrity measurement
and attestation service to evaluate the integrity of
local or remote software components; (2) a description
of our prototype implementation of this design: Maat,
named after the Egyptian goddess of truth, balance,
and justice; and (3) an illustrative discussion of how
Maat can be applied to integrate M&A with platform
management systems and network-scale middleware.
Trust decisions are common in today’s computing
environments. For example, when logging into an
online banking site, users must trust the integrity of
both their local software and the software running
the bank’s website. When outsourcing computation
to a cloud computing provider, users must trust that
the cloud infrastructure will faithfully execute their
software without allowing third parties to interfere
with or observe their actions. When a client joins
a network, a mutual integrity decision is made: the
user generally must trust the integrity of the services
provided by the network, such as DNS configuration,
and the network operator generally trusts the client
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and grants access to internal services, such as a lo-
cal file sharing server that would not be addressable
from the global internet. No single set of integrity
evidence can be used to justify trust in all of these
scenarios. In each case, it is necessary to balance
the trusting party’s desire for a complete evaluation,
and the trusted party’s desire to limit disclosure of
sensitive data.
Maat provides a central framework and standard
application programming interface (API) for policy-
driven selection of measurement utilities and attesta-
tion protocols suitable for a wide variety of platform
trust decisions. This centralization is critical to en-
sure correct administration of integrity policies and
systems, rather than independently managing a mul-
titude of disparate integrity measurement systems.
The next subsection gives a general overview of the
goals of M&A. Section 2 describes specific desirable
properties for M&A. Section 3 examines related work
against these properties. Section 4 describes the Maat
framework. Section 5 describes three example use
cases for Maat including experience in a production
environment. Sections 6 and 7 conclude by describing
areas of future work and summarizing this paper’s
contributions.
1.1 M&A Background
Integrity measurement systems (IMS) provide mech-
anisms for determining what software is installed or
running on a platform, and validating the on-disk
system configuration and current state of running
software. These systems necessarily include a mea-
surement agent that collects evidence describing the
state of a target, and an appraiser that evaluates the
integrity of the target based on the evidence produced.
The attestation protocol defines how the evidence from
the target is bundled, transferred, and presented to
the appraiser.
As shown in Figure 1 (derived from [1]), these com-
ponents may exist in a variety of architectures. Some
systems may exist locally on a single platform, while
others may be components distributed across a net-
work. Any attempt at providing a general purpose
interface for M&A must enable this kind of architec-
tural diversity.
There are many types of evidence that can inform
an integrity evaluation. One approach to integrity
measurement, where measurements are cryptographic
hashes of the static image of boot-time software, is de-
scribed by England et al. [2] and adopted by the
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) as part of the
“Trusted Boot” technology [3]. Other work, such as
Sailer et al.’s Integrity Measurement Architecture
(IMA), takes cryptographic hashes of executables and
other files used during platform operation [4]. Dy-
namic measurement techniques, such as the Linux Ker-
nel Integrity Measurer (LKIM), move beyond hashes
to introspection-based validation of critical runtime
data structures [1]. Each of these measurement agents
provides a unique form of evidence that supports dif-
ferent notions of software integrity.
Similarly, there may be multiple attestation pro-
tocols which provide varying degrees of protection
and confidence in the evidence collected. Many attes-
tation protocols rely on a Trusted Platform Module
(TPM)[5] to provide a static root of trust for measure-
ment and the measure-before-use sequence from the
BIOS to the OS kernel and beyond [6][7][8]. Flicker
defines a variation on this using the dynamic root
of trust for measurement to provide a protected, at-
testable execution environment at runtime [9]. OASIS
proposes providing a protected execution environment
but roots trust in a physically unclonable function
(PUF) [10]. Schemes for pure software-based attesta-
tion typically rely on timing requirements for comput-
ing a complex hash-like function over both the target
and the measurement agent itself [11][12][13][14].
2 Properties of M&A
Loscocco et al. define a set of desirable properties
for software integrity measurement tools [1]. Coker
et al. define a similar set of desirable properties for
attestation protocols [15]. We designed Maat to sup-
port measurement and attestation components satis-
fying these properties and, by extension, enable M&A
services to support trustworthy inferences made by
appraisers in a wide variety of possible trust decisions.
Two of the identified properties, completeness and
freshness, relate specifically to measurement functions.
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Figure 1: Four possible layouts for an IMS [1]. (a) The Measurement Agent (MA) and Target (T) share an
execution environment; the Appraiser (App) is on a physically distinct host. (b) The Measurement Agent is
isolated from the Target using dedicated hardware or virtualization; the Appraiser is on a physically distinct
host. (c) Each component is on a distinct host. (d) The Measurement Agent is hosted with the Appraiser
while the Target is on a dedicated host.
Achieving these helps ensure that appraisers are bas-
ing their decisions on measurement data that reflects
the current complete running state of the target. One
of the attestation properties, semantic explicitness,
addresses the degree that measurement data contains
the necessary evidence required for the trust decision
that triggered the attestation. These three properties
govern the quality of trust decisions that the M&A
mechanisms support. Therefore, it is imperative that
an M&A framework be capable of supporting mea-
surement agents and attestation protocols with these
properties for all anticipated trust decisions requiring
measurement evidence as an input.
In order to address the important question of
whether the appraiser should trust the evidence that
it has received, three additional properties apply: au-
thenticity, correctness, and protection. Authenticity
guarantees that the evidence came from an authentic
source and reflects the target of interest. Correctness
relates to the sound design and correct implemen-
tation of all of the M&A component mechanisms.
Protection addresses the ability of the system to suffi-
ciently protect all of the M&A components to enable
them to meet their trust obligations to the appraiser.
These properties apply both to individual measure-
ment agents and attestation protocols, and to the
M&A framework itself. The framework must be de-
signed to (1) guarantee that the correct mechanisms
are invoked when necessary, (2) ensure order of opera-
tion where out of order execution could impact trust,
(3) limit accesses to and by M&A components, and
(4) restrict access to M&A functions and resources
from other parts of the system.
The purpose of an M&A framework is to provide
a general-purpose service for integrity measurement.
The properties of flexibility and usability apply to
this goal. Flexibility implies an ability to (1) support
multiple appraisers, measurement agents and attesta-
tion protocols; (2) select appropriate mechanisms in
the context of given trust decisions, perhaps filtering
results according to specific system policies (e.g., pri-
vacy); and (3) incorporate future M&A mechanisms.
Usability implies that context should tailor the pre-
sentation of measurement data, including possible
post-collection processing, to the specific needs of a
given trust decision.
2.1 Critical Features
We designed Maat to support the eight high-level
properties described above: completeness, freshness,
semantic explicitness, authenticity, correctness, pro-
tection, flexibility, and usability. To meet these high-
level properties, Maat includes the following concrete
architectural features:
• Support for Multiple Appraisers: Platform
integrity evaluations may be required in a wide
variety of circumstances, and may be evaluated
by several different appraisers. Each appraiser
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may have its own notions of what evidence is re-
quired to show integrity, and how that evidence
should be collected and presented. A flexible
M&A system should be usable across a range of
appraisers to prevent duplication and fragmenta-
tion of M&A functionality.
• Support for Multiple Attestation Proto-
cols: Different attestation protocols can all
present the same primary evidence, but the ap-
praiser may be able to draw different conclusions
on the correctness, freshness and authenticity of
the data, based on the different bundling style.
For example, one protocol may produce an aggre-
gate measurement report with a single signature
covering all measurements, another protocol may
produce individually signed reports for each piece
of evidence collected, and a third may produce
a chain of reports where each signature covers a
report and the hash of the previous signed report.
Allowing the policy-driven selection of protocols
to suit the needs of each specific attestation sce-
nario enhances the flexibility and usability of the
M&A system.
• Support for Multiple Measurement
Agents: Different evidence may be required to
show the integrity of different components or
to provide varying levels of confidence in one
component. Some measurement agents may
provide only boot-time evidence of integrity,
such as a TPM quote, while others may generate
fresher or more complete evidence showing
integrity at runtime. Additionally, appraisers
may require the use of a specific measurement
agent to ensure correctness, e.g., an appraiser
may accept the reports of a malware scanner
from one vendor but not another. It is important
for the M&A service to allow for policy-driven
selection of measurement agents appropriate to
a scenario. Like support for multiple appraisers
and protocols, this feature directly supports the
flexibility and usability of the M&A system.
• Policy-based Negotiation: The M&A service
should be capable of negotiating with a peer to
select a protocol and evidence set that satisfies
each peer’s policy. Appraisers are likely to seek
the most detailed evidence of attester integrity
possible, while attesters are likely to want to
limit disclosure of sensitive platform information.
Both parties may want to limit the resources re-
quired to complete the attestation. Support for
policy-based negotiation allows parties to find
a protocol and evidence pair that is consistent
with these goals. The need for policy-based ne-
gotiation is largely a consequence of support for
multiple appraisers, protocols, and agents and
thus contributes to the flexibility and usability of
the system.
• Discrete M&A Functions: To ensure the
trustworthiness of their measurements, the ser-
vice should ensure measurement agents are pro-
tected from both the target of their measurement
and from other parts of the measurement frame-
work. For example, measurement agents may
require exceptional authority, such as the ability
to read kernel memory or attach a debugger to
arbitrary processes. These privileges should be
isolated in the smallest possible components and
carefully controlled via platform access control
policy. This isolation also allows for fine-grained
policy regarding the authenticity and correctness
properties of each component.
• Support for Registration: To provide extensi-
bility of the supported attestation protocols and
measurement agents, the service must include
a registration mechanism to ensure that only
valid combinations of agents and protocols are
available for negotiation, and that the platform’s
security policy is enforced for all installed compo-
nents. Registration ensures that (1) only correct
components are accessible by the M&A system,
that (2) the purpose of these components is ex-
plicitly defined, that (3) these components will be
correctly protected, and that (4) their reports are
authentic because they can not be circumvented.
• Portability: The M&A service should support
deployment in a wide range of systems, including
different components within a single system. In
order to provide a complete and protected plat-
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form view, the M&A service should be designed
and implemented in such a way that it can func-
tion in any environment, including on a client
system, server, or embedded device in physical
systems; or in the host, hypervisor, guest, and/or
dedicated virtual machines (VMs) in a virtualized
system.
• Composability: Integrity evaluations may re-
quire the gathering and evaluation of evidence
from multiple administrative realms within a sin-
gle platform, or across multiple hosts. Multiple
instances of the M&A service should work to-
gether to delegate both evidence collection and
evaluation tasks to the most appropriate instance.
Because measurement functionality must be pro-
tected from the target of measurement, providing
a complete evaluation of a virtualized platform
may involve cooperation between instances of the
M&A service in a guest VM, in an administrative
VM, and in the virtual machine monitor (VMM)
itself.
• Support for Complex, State-based Mea-
surements: The service should allow for com-
plex evidence collection. An attestation may re-
quire invoking a collection of measurement agents
that each inspects a different aspect of target
state. To perform a complete evaluation, col-
lected evidence or intermediate evaluation results
may introduce additional measurement require-
ments. For example, if a software inventory mea-
surement shows that a Kerberos authentication
package is installed, a measurement of the Ker-
beros configuration may be required. These kinds
of recursive measurement dependencies necessi-
tate M&A support for incremental discovery of
measurement requirements.
Table 1 gives a summary of how these features
collectively support all the identified properties for
M&A.
2.2 Adversary Model
The goal of measurement and attestation is to detect
adversaries that seek to alter the long-term behavior
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Multiple Appraisers X X
Multiple Protocols X X X X X X
Multiple Agents X X X X X X X
Negotiation X X
Discrete Functions X X X
Registration X X X X
Portability X X
Composability X X
Complex Measurement X
Table 1: Summary table showing how our critical fea-
tures for an M&A framework align with the properties
of M&A identified by Loscocco et al. in [1] and Coker
et al. in [15].
of a platform by modifying long-lived data residing
either in memory or on persistent storage. Specific
measurement configurations may address adversaries
with limited capabilities, such as modification of user
level programs but not kernel data. Other configu-
rations may target much more powerful adversaries
capable of arbitrarily modifying data anywhere on
the platform, including in the OS, Virtual Machine
Manager (VMM), and BIOS/System Manage Mode
(SMM) memory and storage. A framework that at-
tempts to unify all M&A activities should support
measurements that can be used in aggregate to iden-
tify traces of all classes of adversaries.
The details of the measurement strategies employed
by measurement agents are out of scope for the pur-
poses of this paper and the development of Maat.
The properties and requirements described in this
section allow for measurement agents to be used in
conjunction to detect existing and future adversaries.
Maat’s emphasis on composability is particularly
important to supporting detection of a broad range
of adversaries. Maat is designed to support collection
of evidence at different levels of trust throughout
the platform. By evaluating evidence collected at a
level of trust higher than the expected adversary’s
capabilities, the appraiser can justify confidence in
less trusted components.
5
3 Related Work
A primary purpose of operating systems is to provide
a set of reusable abstractions to support the devel-
opment and execution of user applications. Features
that are common across many applications are good
candidates for extraction into a system-wide service
to free developers from the need to maintain sepa-
rate solutions and to centralize administration for end
users.
The Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM)
framework is a good example of this philosophy [16].
Authentication was originally performed directly in
the login process, but as the number of programs
implementing authentication and mechanisms for pro-
viding authentication grew, the PAM library became
necessary to provide a single interface for program-
mers and a configuration point for users. Thanks to
this centralization, the system administrator uses a
single configuration system to define what kinds of
authentication may be used in what circumstances.
The need for a system-wide service for integrity eval-
uations follows a similar argument. There is a growing
body of work on software integrity measurement and
attestation. We have observed numerous instances of
isolated or implicit integrity evaluations in common
platform usage, and a growth in the number of mech-
anisms supporting the collection and presentation of
platform integrity.
3.1 Measurement Agents
Measurement agents gather evidence that must be
evaluated against some policy to determine a target’s
integrity. There are a large number of measurement
agents that collect evidence that may be part of an
integrity decision. TPM quotes are a common form of
evidence used to verify that the platform software was
valid at platform startup. Other tools, such as IMA [4]
and Bit9 [17], provide load-time checks on programs
as they launch and are used to verify that the software
being run was valid at program start time. Dynamic
runtime systems, like LKIM [1] and Semantic Integrity
[18], can verify that both the static and dynamic state
of a piece of software is valid at a specific time in the
process’s life cycle. Common system administrative
tools can also be used as measurement agents. For
example, the firewall configuration could be measured
against an approved configuration, or a recently com-
pleted virus scan could be used as evidence to inform
an integrity decision.
Some agents, such as LKIM, IMA, and tools for
retrieving TPM quotes, may be designed to provide
only the basic collection capability. Others, such as
SecureBoot [19] and IMA/EVM [20], combine evalua-
tion with collection. Maat can incorporate the results
of all types of measurement agents, and provides a cen-
tralized framework for the selection and aggregation
of measurements.
3.2 Existing M&A Frameworks
Several M&A frameworks, including Trusted Network
Connect (TNC), SAMSON, and OpenAttestation are
implemented and in active use. These frameworks
generally include their own measurement agents, a
specific protocol for gathering and communicating
measurements, and components for evaluating the
evidence presented. These systems are somewhat
comparable to Maat, but have much narrower focus
and limited extensibility. TNC is focused specifically
on attestation for the purpose of access control [21].
SAMSON is focused on remote attestation of client
machines in an enterprise environment [22]. And,
OpenAttestation is focused on remote attestation in
enterprise or cloud environments [23]. Table 2 shows
how existing framework solutions for integrity com-
pare to Maat in satisfying the features described in
Section 2.1.
None of these systems addresses how attestation can
be more fully integrated into the platform to reduce
redundancy and ease administration. As a result, on a
typical GNU/Linux platform, two completely indepen-
dent implementations of TNC may be installed: one as
part of the WPA supplicant tool for wireless network
connectivity, and another as part of the strongSwan
IPsec package. These implementations are derived
from independent codebases, managed via distinct
configuration files, and utilize redundant but incom-
patible plugins for integrity measurement collection
and verification.
Nearly all systems discussed here provide a plu-
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Feature SAMSON TNC O.A. Maat
Multiple Appraisers X X
Multiple Protocols X
Multiple Agents X X X
Policy-Based Negotiation X
Discrete Components X
Registration / /
Portability X
Composability X
Complex Measurements X X X
Table 2: Comparison of framework architectures for
integrity measurement against the list of critical fea-
tures delineated in Section 2.1. ‘X’ indicates a fea-
ture is supported, ‘/‘ indicates a features is partially
supported, and a blank indicates no support for the
feature.
gin mechanism to run multiple types of measurement
agents. The TNC specifications are specifically de-
signed around the idea of pluggable integrity measure-
ment collectors (IMCs) and integrity measurement
verifiers (IMVs). During attestation, the TNC client
(attester) executes a predefined set of IMCs, and the
TNC server (appraiser) executes a corresponding set
of IMVs. The IMCs and IMVs communicate with
each other via the TNCCS protocol[24]. SAMSON
is designed around a plugin architecture, and uses
TNC interfaces and protocols. OpenAttestation is the
only system to hard-code the supported measurement
agents.
Few systems feature policy-based negotiation, and
in most cases the evaluator demands a particular
set of measurements and the client must either al-
low those measurements or refuse to participate. In
some commercial systems targeting enterprise client
management, the attesting software seems to be hard
coded to unconditionally satisfy any requests for attes-
tation. No system we evaluated supported selection
of scenario-specific attestation protocols, or collec-
tion and composition of measurements from multiple
administrative domains.
Support for strong isolation is also remarkably rare.
In all the systems we examined, measurement col-
lectors and evaluators ran within the same process
that responds to requests and communicates with the
attestation peer. Given that few systems support the
other features, it is unsurprising that they do not pro-
vide much support for registration. OpenAttestation
does not support plugins, so there is nothing to regis-
ter. TNC specifies that each IMC/IMV filename be
explicitly listed in a configuration file, but this simple
mechanism contains insufficient metadata about each
component to fully inform the types of decisions a
framework must make. The SAMSON documentation
does not indicate any specific registration mechanism.
3.3 Auditing Frameworks
Network monitoring systems, such as Nagios [25], are
intended to allow system and network administrators
to quickly collect status data on a large number of
systems. Like Maat, auditing systems tend to be
built around a modular design, and may have mod-
ules for collecting similar data such as system logs,
TPM boot-time measurements, or filesystem hashes.
However, auditing systems are generally aimed at
collecting statistics within a single administrative do-
main, and are designed around a much simpler trust
model. Auditing agents are installed and configured
by an administrator, and are specifically designed to
report any requested data to the single central auditor
controlled by the network administrator.
The need for auditing capabilities for cloud comput-
ing platforms is widely recognized. Ko et al. [26] iden-
tify security, privacy, accountability, and auditability
as components of trust in cloud computing, and de-
scribe a high-level layered model, called TrustCloud,
for analyzing accountability in a cloud environment.
Abbadi et al. [27] provide a more detailed breakdown
of requirements for supporting trust in clouds, and
define TPM-based attestation protocols for one-way
and mutual authentication. They do not delve into
how the required agents should be implemented on
the hosts or integrated into existing platform services
other than to note that the agents must not “reveal
domain credentials in the clear, . . . transfer domain
protection keys to others, [or] . . . transfer sensitive
domain content unprotected to others”. Maat gives a
concrete framework for implementing and integrating
these concepts.
Flogger [28] implements an auditing system using
a kernel module for interception of filesystem accesses
on a physical host and within a VM, a process for
uploading logs from VMs to a receiver process on
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the physical host, and a database that consolidates
reports from multiple physical machines. This work is
narrowly focused on the problem of cloud auditing of
file system events. It does not consider other applica-
tions of attestation, and leaves security and integrity
concerns as an area of future work. Progger [29] is
follow-on work that expands the scope of Flogger and
addresses some of the log integrity concerns, but is still
narrowly focused on data provenance auditing, and
relies on the integrity of VM kernels to provide trust.
Both Flogger and Progger are examples of systems
that assume a particular goal for evidence collection
and implement a single collection and presentation
strategy to support that goal. Maat provides a design
methodology for isolating these concerns and a general
infrastructure for integrating them into systems.
Singh et. al [30] identify the need for strong, policy-
driven middleware for both audit collection and en-
forcement for internet of things (IoT) and cloud-based
systems. While they focus on system-wide informa-
tion flow control, they call out specific need for trust
on the platform and ways to verify that auditing policy
is being faithfully enforced. We see Maat as comple-
mentary; it provides both the on-platform capability
for policy enforcement and verification, and a trusted
remote attestation mechanism.
4 Architecture
Maat is our prototype system that is explicitly de-
signed to meet all of the desirable properties discussed
in Section 2. Figure 2 shows the basic architecture of
Maat. The Attestation Manager (AM) (Section 4.4)
receives incoming requests, uses the Selection Policy
(Section 4.4.1) to negotiate which protocols to run and
what evidence to gather, and spawns the agreed-upon
Attestation Protocol Block (APB) (Section 4.5). Fol-
lowing the prescribed Measurement Specification (Sec-
tion 4.6), APBs invoke Attestation Service Providers
(ASPs) (Section 4.7) to gather required measurements.
4.1 Attestation Roles
Measurement, attestation, and evaluation are most
commonly conceived as one party, the attester, gen-
Attestation
Manager
Selection
Policy
Attestation
Request
Attestation Protocol 
Block
Measurement/
Appraisal
Specification
Attestation
Service
Provider
Attestation
Service
Provider
Figure 2: The architecture of Maat showing the At-
testation Manager (AM), Attestation Protocol Blocks
(APBs), and Attestation Service Providers (ASPs).
erating evidence and presenting it to a remote party,
the appraiser, for evaluation. Figure 3 depicts how
this common model of attestation is supported by
Maat. Prior to the flows pictured, the appraiser AM
receives a request to perform an integrity evaluation
of the attester. The attestation begins with a nego-
tiation (flow 1) between the attester and appraiser
AMs. Once a suitable protocol/evidence pair has been
agreed upon, the AMs each execute the APB imple-
menting their half of the protocol (flow 2). During
the protocol execution, measurements are gathered on
the attester by ASPs and passed to the APB (flow 3).
The attester’s APB bundles the evidence and sends it
to the appraiser’s APB (flow 4). The appraiser’s APB
parses the evidence received from the attester and
passes it to a series of ASPs representing the appraisal
decision logic (flow 5). The result of this appraisal
is then returned, possibly with additional supporting
data, to the original requester.
The diversity of scenarios for integrity evaluation
implies additional models for attestation. For exam-
ple, some may happen entirely locally to a platform;
others may split the appraisal, performing some local
checks and some remote checks; and some attestations
may include third party trusted appraisers. Maat is
flexible enough to support these diverse models. In
particular, any component in Maat may perform as
either an attester or an appraiser, even within the
same attestation.
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Appraiser AM
APB
(2) fork()
APB
(2) fork()
(3) APB/ASP
Comms
ASPs
(5) APB/ASP
Comms
Attester Platform Appraiser Platform
ASPs
Attester AM (1) Negotiation
(4) Evidence
Figure 3: A common model for attestations in which
separate instances of Maat play the roles of attester
and appraiser
4.2 Security Model
Section 2 discussed the importance of protecting an
attestation service from interference by the target of
measurement. Attestation services regularly commu-
nicate with untrusted parties, and require significant
local authority in order to collect measurements. This
makes any attestation service an attractive attack
vector for adversaries seeking to gain access to a plat-
form. To limit the impact of an adversary subverting
an attestation component, it is imperative that the
entire system be sandboxed to the greatest possible
extent, and that internal components are protected
from one another.
Maat’s security model is designed around discrete
M&A functions. The AM, APBs, and ASPs each exe-
cute in separate processes to allow OS or hypervisor
level controls to assign only the necessary privileges
to each component. Maat uses standard UNIX access
control mechanisms, POSIX capabilities, SELinux,
and VM isolation and introspection to provide vary-
ing levels of isolation between the components.
This isolation allows low-level measurements to be
collected by more trusted components and used to
support the trustworthiness of higher-level measure-
ments. For example, a measurement of a VM’s kernel
and Maat instance collected via VM introspection
may give an appraiser confidence in the validity of
measurements collected by the Maat instance running
in the VM. The ability to chain measurements to gain
confidence in higher-level measurement functionality
is critical to justifying trust in the Maat framework.
Ultimately, the chain should be rooted in a highly
trustworthy component such as a small, verified hy-
pervisor running an embedded “mini-Maat” instance
and statically measured into a TPM at boot time.
We have implemented necessary hooks and poli-
cies for governing Maat interactions using standard
POSIX discretionary access controls (DAC), Linux
capabilities, and SELinux mandatory access controls.
These models can be coordinated to provide granular
control over process privileges. The DAC model al-
lows each component in Maat to run with individual
user permissions specified at registration. This allows
the externally communicating components (the AM
and APBs) to run as unprivileged users while only
the measurement gathering ASPs are run with higher
privileges. A set of Linux capabilities [31] can be
specified at registration to further limit the admin-
istrative actions an ASP running as the super user
may perform. SELinux provides an even greater level
of isolation, as each APB and ASP can be given a
unique SELinux domain with exactly the necessary
privileges.
SELinux also provides guarantees that measure-
ments are collected by the correct component invoked
in the correct way. The AM’s executable is given an
SELinux type that has sole transition access to the
correct domain for the AM, files containing keys used
to identify the AM are given an SELinux type that
can only be read by this domain, and APB images
are given types that can only be launched by this
domain. On APB launch, SELinux forces a transition
into a domain with access to exactly the set of cre-
dentials and ASPs appropriate for that APB. Finally,
ASPs are run in domains with the minimal privileges
necessary to execute their particular function. Com-
bining trust in Maat and SELinux with a carefully
constructed protocol allows an appraiser to conclude
that the measurements presented by the attester were
collected by the correct components.
Maat also uses SELinux’s category mechanism to
isolate concurrent attestations similar to how vir-
tual machines are isolated from one another under
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sVirt[32]. The AM is initially provided with a large
set of categories. Each attestation session is handled
by spawning a child process of the AM to perform ne-
gotiation and then execute an APB. The parent AM
gives each child a unique set of categories in which to
execute. The APB can then similarly apportion its
categories to ASPs as they are executed. This policy
protects the platform from subversion of Maat, pro-
tects Maat from subversion of the platform (excepting
attacks that subvert the operating system kernel), and
protects each component of Maat from subversions in
other components.
For many measurement goals, OS level isolation
is insufficient to guarantee the needed isolation of
measurement agent and target. Most notably, mea-
surements of an OS kernel itself can’t be reliably
performed from a process running on top of the OS.
One solution to this problem is to implement ASPs
to self-protect using existing hardware mechanisms.
Specifically, an ASP could use a Flicker-like approach
to establish a protected execution environment or
Intel’s Secure Guard eXtensions (SGX) to create a
secure enclave[33]. These solutions work and are sup-
ported by the Maat architecture, but may require
substantial code replication across multiple ASPs.
4.3 Multi-Realm Attestations
Maat is intended to be replicated in each adminis-
trative or protection domain throughout a platform.
During negotiation and attestation, instances of the
architecture in one domain may delegate decisions
or evidence collection to another instance in a more
appropriate domain. This scheme reuses the existing
Maat functionality to provide a common interface
for invoking measurement capabilities that require
greater isolation than can be provided within a single
operating system.
For example, on a virtualized platform there may
be instances of the M&A architecture running:
• In each guest VM, for measuring the userspace
of that VM
• In the administrator VM, for measuring the ker-
nels of the guests and the administrator VM’s
userspace
• In the VMM, for measuring the administrator
VM
This hierarchy allows for trustworthy collection of
evidence at all levels from the guest VM to the kernel
of the administrator VM. Given appropriate hardware
protection capabilities, another instance capable of
measuring the VMM itself is possible.
There are many open research challenges related to
combining measurements from multiple administra-
tive domains that must be answered. These include:
(1) the correct place to store policy and perform ne-
gotiations, (2) in what order to invoke measurements,
and (3) how to endorse and combine measurements
to produce a thorough argument that each measure-
ment was properly collected and communicated. Maat
is able to support many alternate solutions to each
of these problems, and thus provides a useful basis
for experimentation and the eventual integration of
adopted solutions.
4.4 Attestation Manager
The AM has two jobs in Maat: (1) it acts as a regis-
tration point for APBs, ASPs, Measurement Specifi-
cations, and (2) it is responsible for negotiating and
dispatching protocol/evidence pairs for each attesta-
tion request. The same AM software is capable of
acting as either an appraiser or an attester, and in
complex attestation scenarios may take on elements
of each role.
In order to negotiate an attestation scenario with a
peer in good faith, the AM must know which APBs,
ASPs, and Measurement Specifications are available
on the system. We have partially implemented a reg-
istration mechanism for Maat that achieves this by
relying on the target system’s native package man-
ager to correctly resolve dependencies between compo-
nents and assign appropriate permissions (user, group,
SELinux label) to the installed files. Each component
is identified by a UUID that is specified in a meta-
data file installed as part of the component’s package.
These UUIDs are used at runtime to resolve depen-
dencies, and are the basis for the AM’s negotiation
protocol.
While this implementation meets many of our goals
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such as dependency tracking and automatic security
label assignment, it does not allow for additional
checks on the pedigree of individual components nor
does it facilitate smooth updating of the AM’s selec-
tion policy. Currently, these checks are performed
at load time using the metadata file provided with
each component. Future versions of Maat will fea-
ture a more complete registration mechanism that
performs these checks at registration time. This mech-
anism will enhance the existing package management
functions with customized dependency and pedigree
checks using the included metadata file. Additionally,
registration should move away from explicit UUID-
based dependencies in favor of feature-based depen-
dency tracking. For example, APBs should be able to
specify measurement collection features by name and
pedigree requirements rather than specific UUIDs of
required ASPs. This will allow for negotiations based
on properties of attestations rather than well known
UUIDs.
4.4.1 Selection Policy
Negotiation of an attestation protocol and measure-
ment specification is guided by local selection policies
at both the attester and the appraiser. The goal
of negotiation is to select a protocol/evidence pair
that satisfies the integrity checks required by the ap-
praiser without violating the privacy or exceeding the
computational limits of the attester. The appraiser’s
selection policy defines what protocols and evidence
are necessary to assess the integrity of a given at-
tester requesting access to a specified resource. The
attester’s selection policy defines which protocols and
evidence it is willing to provide to a given appraiser
in order to gain access to a given resource.
The policy must contain a series of declarative rules
mapping inputs describing the current attestation to
actions. The policy may be stored either in a simple
file or as a database for larger policies. For both the
appraiser and attester, the inputs to the selection
policy are:
• the role of the party in the attestation
• the other party’s identity
• the strength of this identity association
• the resource being requested
• the current state of the negotiation.
Figures 4a and 4b show state machine views of the
negotiation and selection processes on the appraiser
and attester respectively.
A request for integrity evaluation received by the ap-
praiser must specify the identity of the attester and the
resource being guarded. The appraiser matches these
inputs against its policy, which may result in a match
failure (not pictured), a request for a stronger iden-
tity binding, a deferral, or a set of protocol/evidence
options.
In the first case, attestation is aborted and an error
is returned. If a stronger identity binding is needed, a
call can be made to an ISAKMP daemon to produce
the needed association before continuing the negotia-
tion. If negotiation is deferred to another appraiser,
the request is forwarded and a proxy process may be
created to forward messages if necessary. If a set of
options is returned, an initial contract is generated
and sent to the attester.
The attester uses these inputs to consult its policy.
If successful, this results in a counter offer: a subset of
the offered options that the attester is willing to per-
form. These options are sent to the appraiser, which
then consults its policy to determine the preferred
option, sends this option to the attester, and begins
execution of the corresponding appraisal APB. The
attester performs a final policy check to verify the
suitability of the appraiser’s selection, then executes
the selected APB.
This negotiation process is intended to ensure that
the optimal protocol and evidence are selected. No-
tably, the selection is made by the appraiser rather
than the attester. This necessitates an extra com-
munication round trip in the protocol, but ensures
that the appraiser’s prioritization is respected. An
alternate solution could treat the initial options as
a prioritized list rather than an unordered set, and
trust that the attester will select the highest priority
option consistent with its policy. This choice does
not seem to have any direct impacts on the trust-
worthiness of the selection: the appraiser shouldn’t
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Figure 4: State machine depictions of (a) Appraiser
and (b) Attester selection processes. The selection
policy is consulted at each state to determine what
action to take.
offer any options that are not sufficient for its trust
goals, and it must already trust that the attester is
correctly implementing negotiation. However, the ex-
tra step provides more explicit appraiser control over
the outcome of negotiation in exchange for minimal
performance overhead (performance is typically domi-
nated by the measurement collection) that could be
easily eliminated by a cache of negotiation outcomes.
4.5 Attestation Protocol Blocks
APBs are responsible for understanding the require-
ments of a particular attestation scenario as defined
by the Measurement Specification, executing an ap-
propriate sequence of ASPs to satisfy the scenario,
and collecting the results generated by individual
ASPs into a cohesive whole that is consumable by
the remote party. Dually, an APB may implement
an appraisal component that evaluates evidence by
invoking a sequence of ASPs to verify properties of
the measurement data and synthesizing a final report
indicating the overall determination of integrity along
with any required supporting evidence. Protocols may
be implemented either as two separate APBs, one for
the attester and one for the appraiser, or as a single
APB that determines which role to execute based on
context provided by the AM.
APBs rely on ASPs and/or other APBs to produce
or evaluate measurements. Upon registration with
the AM, each APB must provide an XML metadata
file that statically lists supported Measurement Spec-
ifications and defines the set of ASPs and sub-APBs
required to execute the protocol. With this informa-
tion, the AM can ensure that all dependencies can be
satisfied, and can invalidate a protocol if any of its
dependencies are de-registered.
We separate evidence collection and collation into
ASP and APB functionality respectively to allow for
greater reuse of components, to support finer-grained
policy decisions, and to enable more granular access
control decisions to isolate pieces of M&A function-
ality. However, Maat is flexible and can accomodate
“fat” APBs that collect evidence directly or “fat” ASPs
that collect multiple types of data.
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1 measure p :: path
2 | is reg p = sha1sum p
3 | is dir p = dirlist p >>=
measure
4 otherwise = success
5 do measure ("/etc" :: path)
Figure 5: Example measurement specification for re-
cursively enumerating and hashing regular files in the
/etc directory.
4.6 Measurement Specifications
Measurement Specifications define what evidence the
requester requires for a specific scenario. Separat-
ing the evidence requirements from the protocol used
to collect and transmit evidence (APBs) allows the
construction of generic APBs that can be re-used
for multiple attestation scenarios. Like APBs, Mea-
surement Specifications are registered with the AM
and are identified by a well-known UUID. Once an
APB/Measurement Specification pair is negotiated,
the APB is launched using the Measurement Specifi-
cation as input.
Measurement Specifications contain as much infor-
mation as is necessary to define the type of evidence
required. Implementations may define a specifica-
tion language that provides rich syntax for defining
complex evidence relationships. Any such language
must be understood by the APBs, which parse the
specification into a series of actionable instructions.
Maat includes an implementation of a specification
language as an optional library. Specifications in
this language define a set of measurement variables
that identify particular data requiring measurement,
and measurement instructions that define what mea-
surements are required for variables of a given type.
During evaluation, measurement instructions may in-
troduce new variables that must be measured. The
complete measurement requires recursively evaluating
these measurement obligations until no new variables
are introduced.
The complete syntax and semantics of Maat’s mea-
surement specification language are beyond the scope
of this paper. The example given in Figure 5 pro-
vides a reasonable overview of the language’s features.
This example implements a common goal of integrity
measurement systems: to provide a TripWire[34]-like
summary of the hashes of all files recursively found
in the /etc directory.
The specification language supports specification
composition, since multiple specifications may cause
different evidence to be collected for the same piece
of target state. For example, another specification
that extracts a list of users from the /etc/passwd
file may be combined with the example in Figure 5
to generate a measurement containing both a hash of
/etc/passwd and the list of users. The evaluation or-
der of measurement instructions is not strictly defined.
Our example APBs utilize a queue of measurement
obligations and continue executing until the queue
is empty, but any strategy that guarantees that all
obligations are eventually discharged is valid.
4.7 Attestation Service Providers
Attestation Service Providers (ASPs) are the basic
functional unit of Maat. Each ASP performs a specific,
discrete function in evidence collection tasks. For ex-
ample, an ASP can gather a specific piece of evidence
from the system, ingest some type of evidence and
contribute to an assessment of the target’s integrity,
provide post-processing functions such as hashing or
compression, or call out to external components such
as another AM or service. Maat makes no distinction
between ASPs that collect evidence and ASPs that
evaluate evidence. This decision is intended to help
support more complex attestation scenarios in which
partial appraisals may occur locally with measure-
ment collection, or with a third party appraiser not
involved in the initial negotiations.
ASPs are invoked by an APB, using an
implementation-defined interface. In line with our de-
sire for discrete M&A functions, ASPs run in their own
address space and may have their own fine-grained
policies. ASPs may be invoked as a discrete event,
chained into a pipeline, or called multiple times for
a single attestation. The ordering of invocation is
determined by the APB and its interpretation of the
Measurement Specification.
13
5 Example Use Cases
The prototype implementation of Maat allows us to
verify that the proposed architecture is flexible enough
to integrate and/or consolidate integrity information
in a variety of deployment scenarios. These include
both augmenting existing systems with additional plu-
gins that call out to Maat externally, and subsuming
existing services into Maat as APBs or ASPs. We
provide several examples of integrating Maat in the
following sections.
5.1 Authentication
Many UNIX systems use the PAM library to provide
a system-wide authentication service. As discussed
previously, PAM centralizes authentication decisions,
while providing an extensible architecture through the
use of plugin modules. This extensibility makes in-
corporating integrity information into authentication
decisions straightforward.
An adversary can easily use spoofed authentica-
tion windows to trick users into giving up their
credentials[35]. To enable users to confirm the in-
tegrity of a system before authentication, we inte-
grated Maat with authentication by creating a PAM
module that calls out to Maat for an integrity analysis.
Maat uses a corresponding PAM policy that checks a
system for compliance before the user enters his or her
credentials. If the system fails to meet the required
policy, the interface displays an alert, informing the
user that the system is noncompliant. The combina-
tion of PAM and Maat made it trivial to integrate
system integrity verification into the login process.
5.2 Network Access Control and
IPsec
Network access control (NAC) is implemented by the
802.1x standard, which frequently uses the Trusted
Network Connect (TNC) framework for gathering
measurements from the system before allowing access.
While the limitations of TNC have already been dis-
cussed, the fact that TNC is spiritually similar to
Maat allows interesting opportunities for integration.
Our first method of integration was achieved by
creating a TNC IMC/IMV pair that calls out to the
M&A service, and uses the result of the M&A decision
as input into TNC’s overall NAC decision. This form
of integration is straightforward; however, it makes
the M&A service a subordinate protocol to TNC, and
limits the ability to use the richness available when
using the M&A service directly.
Our second integration of TNC incorporated the
TNC Server, TNC Client, TNC IMC/IMV interface,
and the TNC communications protocol into a pair
of APBs, which are negotiated and directly launched
by Maat’s AM. To achieve this, we took an existing
implementation of the above services (strongSwan)
and wrote a small shim layer to adapt the native
interface of these services to Maat’s APB interface.
The resulting APB allows the TNC infrastructure to
be directly employed through the M&A service for
any purpose, not just for NAC.
To trigger Maat from the NAC process, we wrote
a vendor-specific Extensible Authentication Proto-
col (EAP) method for the NAC server and client,
hostapd and wpa supplicant respectively. The EAP
method communicates with Maat via a UNIX domain
socket, and serves as a proxy between the attester and
appraiser instances. Upon receiving a request, the
attester and appraiser undergo their standard nego-
tiation to select the appropriate attestation protocol
and evidence for the scenario. For TNC, we use a
mapping of evidence spec UUID to sets of IMC/IMV
pairs to determine which IMCs/IMVs the APB should
load and execute. This allows the same TNC APB
to provide and/or evaluate different sets of evidence,
depending on the result of negotiation.
Maat’s inherent flexibility allowed us to implement
both methods of integration. This flexibility is critical
to supporting legacy systems and provides multiple,
straightforward migration paths for network admin-
istrators to continue leveraging existing tools while
taking advantage of Maat’s desirable properties.
TNC can also be used during IPsec authentication.
Our integration with TNC facilitated integration with
IPsec. IPsec negotiates security associations (SAs)
between two hosts on an IP network. These SAs
allow for cryptographically authenticated and/or en-
crypted traffic to be passed between the two hosts
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using information incorporated into the SA. To in-
tegrate Maat with IPsec, we modified the code for
our vendor-specific EAP method to call out from the
strongSwan IPsec stack to the Maat AM, which then
chooses the same TNC APB used for NAC to take a
measurement and send results to the IPsec service.
The ability to use the same TNC APB for both
IPsec and NAC shows that Maat can consolidate
measurement agents, eliminating the need for custom
TNC code in the NAC and IPsec services. Further,
the separation of protocol selection from required
evidence in Maat allows the IPsec scenario to employ
different IMC/IMVs than were selected for NAC.
5.3 Host Monitoring
Network administrators often want to make use of
host integrity data as part of a network monitoring
system. Maat includes a simple web application that
allows network administrators to manage host iden-
tities, view historical integrity reports, and request
fresh integrity evaluations. Using the web interface,
the system administrator can register a host for moni-
toring and request fresh evaluations by specifying the
host(s) to be evaluated and monitoring criterion. The
web application uses an instance of Maat to negotiate
with each target, perform the evaluation, and generate
a detailed report that is then stored in a database.
This use case is common in an enterprise deployment
but is typically handled using ad-hoc or proprietary
reporting systems. Maat provides the same benefits
for a host monitoring system that it does for access
control focused use cases.
For broader impact assessment, an early version of
Maat is currently deployed on a large scale enterprise
network collecting, archiving, and appraising both
periodic and on-demand measurements from several
hundred actively used Linux-based systems. It pro-
vides a single, secure interface for collecting a wide
variety of information, including TPM quotes, soft-
ware inventories, file integrity checks, and kernel in-
tegrity measurements. The IT system administrators
expressed appreciation for Maat’s ability to collect
this variety of measurements. They use five or more
independent, proprietary systems to collect the same
information for other operating systems. Each of
these systems requires financial investment, training,
configuration, and introduces new security concerns to
the IT architecture. Unifying these features in Maat
eliminates this complexity and allows administrators
to quickly access the data they need in a consistent
interface.
5.4 Internet of Things
We further tested Maat’s flexibility and extensibility
by modifying it to measure non-traditional platforms,
such as those used as part of the internet of things
(IoT). Separate from the enterprise use case, these
platforms present significant challenges for M&A such
as lack of common software bases, ad-hoc communi-
cations mechanisms, and potentially severe resource
constraints. However, IoT devices represent a growing
threat [36] to the security of the systems with which
they interact and thus need the same integrity eval-
uation capability available to non-IoT systems. We
divide the class of smart devices into two categories:
high- and low-capability.
High-capability devices are embedded systems that
contain enough resources and platform features to
allow running the entire Maat stack within the con-
straints of their environment. Examples of such sys-
tems include high-end smart appliances and gateways
which run stripped-down versions of standard multi-
tasking operating systems such as Windows or Linux.
These platforms have computing capacity, power, stor-
age, and memory protection necessary to run the en-
tire Maat stack, assuming that Maat were ported to
the target platform and contained appropriate ASPs
to take meaningful measurements. We demonstrated
this by successfully running Maat on a 32-bit ARM
Cortex-A series development platform and a commod-
ity MIPS-based router running OpenWRT [37]. Both
platforms run on custom versions of the Linux oper-
ating system. Once configured, these high-capability
IoT devices operated as part of the Maat system just
as every other platform did.
Low-capability devices are much more constrained,
and often lack the resources to run Maat effectively
without modification. As fully discussed by Clemens
et al. [38], Maat can be modified to provide negotia-
tion and collation features (essentially the AM and
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APB aspects) on a high-capability device while de-
ferring specific measurement collection to a miniatur-
ized instance running on the low-capability device.
The miniaturized instance lacks many of the pro-
tective features of Maat but implements the same
interface for invoking measurement capabilties. The
end result shows how Maat can be used to provide
centrally-managed, policy-driven, comprehensive, and
efficient M&A capabilities to a broad range of plat-
forms, from high-end enterprise systems to severely
resource-constrained environments.
6 Further Research Challenges
While Maat is designed to satisfy the properties de-
scribed in Section 2, there remain many open research
challenges. Some of these challenges will be addressed
by improving the prototype implementation, others
are broader challenges that require further research.
As noted in Section 4.4, the existing registration
mechanism is not expressive enough to support all of
the desired protection properties, and will need to be
improved in future implementations. We also believe
that our current selection policy mechanism will need
refinement to both the language and the dispatch
mechanism to allow for decisions based on attributes
of an attestation scenario that are not currently ex-
posed. Improvements to registration and selection
would also enable a richer negotiation process based
on attributes of the protocols and evidence being se-
lected rather than on UUIDs. Developing an attribute
language that is rich enough to encompass all pos-
sible measurements, protocols, and trust properties
while being precise enough to guarantee compatibility
between endpoints is a significant research problem.
As discussed in Section 4.3, support for multi-realm
attestations is a major area of future work. Maat is
designed to be replicated in each administrative do-
main. However, important research questions remain
that could impact the trustworthiness of attestations.
These include where to store policy and perform ne-
gotiations, in what order to invoke measurements,
and how to endorse and combine measurements to
produce a thorough argument that each measurement
was properly collected and communicated. These are
all open questions that must be answered for trustwor-
thy multi-realm attestations. Maat provides a basis
for experimenting with alternate solutions to each of
these questions.
Further development also suggests the need for a
system to provide comprehensive trust decisions as a
service (TDaaS) in software systems. This requires
integrating Maat into a larger framework that also
provides authentication, identity management, estab-
lishment of security associations, and maintenance of
a cache of known clients and a history of previous
successful negotiations.
As implemented, Maat targets traditional comput-
ers running a POSIX-compliant operating systems.
As noted in Section 5.4, Maat has also been used
to demonstrate M&A on sample IoT devices. How-
ever, the internet consists of many different kinds of
platforms, with varying hardware resources and oper-
ating systems. Supporting the separation guarantees
and negotiation requirements may be a straightfor-
ward engineering task for many platforms, but others
are so resource constrained that they require further
research and re-thinking of what is possible and nec-
essary for integrity measurement. Finally, computing
platforms that are not general purpose often contain
custom software or firmware, requiring that special,
non-portable versions of Maat be integrated with the
custom system. Such diversity remains a challenge to
any framework that aims for broad adoption.
7 Conclusion
The time has come for a central framework for the
collection and presentation of integrity measurements
for use in trust decisions. We believe that such a sys-
tem must adhere to the properties enumerated earlier
in this paper, and prove that such a system is attain-
able today with a discussion of Maat, our prototype
measurement and attestation (M&A) framework.
Maat supports an array of attestation scenarios,
measurement types, and protocols, and it has a high
degree of flexibility to enable seamless integration
with legacy systems. Maat cooperates with both the
target and the requester in an attestation scenario.
Policy-based negotiation allows the requester to spec-
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ify the evidence required to complete an attestation,
and it allows the target to specify under what condi-
tions each piece of evidence may be released. We have
demonstrated the applicability of Maat through mul-
tiple deployment scenarios, and integration of Maat
with PAM, NAC, IPsec, IoT, and client monitoring.
It is our desire for Maat to be used as a basis for
further research into the field of trustworthy integrity
measurement as well as a starting point for robust,
system level M&A services.
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